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Abstract 
 
This paper finds evidence that a public housing privatization 
program produced adverse effects on housing transactions and the 
economy in Hong Kong.  A scheme announced in December 1997, 
offering tenants an opportunity to buy their units at deeply 
discounted prices, reduced public housing tenants’ bids for private 
homes and adversely affected home transactions.  This effect is 
more pronounced than the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis.  An 
effect on housing prices is also indirectly demonstrated though a 
demonstration that a structural break in the housing price 
relationship occurred at the time the privatization program is 
introduced.  Declines in housing prices further eroded employment 
and set off a vicious circle. 
 
JEL Classification Number: E32, R21, R31 
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1. Introduction 
 
Privatization is often believed to be conducive to economic 
efficiency.  Even though this effect is still controversial, any 
suggestion that privatization could lead to the erosion of wealth and 
economic inefficiency would seem ludicrous to economists. 
 
This paper presents evidence that suggests such a possibility.  A 
privatization scheme, if managed poorly, could lead to 
counter-intuitive results.  Working through the “housing ladder 
effect,” or otherwise called the equity effect or the downpayment 
effect, such as described by Stein(1995), Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein, 
and Kim(2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady(2003), privatizing public 
housing cheaply could lead to the erosion of equity values among 
homeowners, which could spread throughout the housing market 
through the housing market quality continuum.  The erosion of 
wealth works dynamically, and wipes out any static efficiency gains 
that could result from the privatization. 
 
Hong Kong’s plunge into a major recession in the wake of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), which broke out in October 1997, is a 
mystery.  The Hong Kong economy had been well known for its 
legendary resilience. Despite a number of momentous setbacks, 
which included the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution in 1966 
through 1976, two major oil crises that plunged most countries of the 
world into recession during the 1970s, and several episodes of 
financial and banking crises, not a single year since 1961 was there 
recorded negative economic growth (See Table 1).  Indeed the 
Hang Seng Index plunged from over 1,700 in 1973 to little more 
than 150 in 1975 without causing an economic decline in any of 
these years.  The banking crises of 1965-66 “at a point posed a 
threat to the entire banking system in Hong Kong,”(Jao, 1993, p. 
242), while those of 1982 to 1986 “were even bigger in scale and 
produced more far-reaching repercussions.”(Jao, op.cit.).   
 
In sharp contrast, the years during and following the Asian 
Financial Crisis were far less tumultuous.  Hong Kong’s major 
trading partners, the US and Mainland China, continued to grow 
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rapidly during the time, while stock market declines were far milder 
than what happened from 1973 to 1975.  Moreover, not a single 
bank failed.  Yet the Hong Kong economy shrank by 5 per cent in 
1998.  This turnout deviated so much from predictions that Jao 
referred to it as “one of the most bizarre and egregious failures in the 
history of economic forecasting.”(Jao, 2001, p.140) 
 
Table 1 also shows that the rebound in 1999 is extremely weak, 
quite unlike the rebounds that followed earlier recessions. 
 
The dramatic and sudden reversal of economic fortunes in 1998 
was also strange.  In a matter of a few months, Hong Kong’s 
unemployment zoomed from 2.2 per cent in the last quarter of 1997 
to 4.3 per cent in the second quarter of 1998.  By the end of 1998, 
the unemployment rate had reached a high of 6 per cent(Table 2).  
 
The often-cited explanation for Hong Kong’s deep recession, 
that the AFC burst the property price bubble and thus produced a 
gigantic negative wealth effect, is simply unconvincing(Jao, 2001, 
p.140).  The transmission mechanism whereby the AFC burst the 
property price bubble is not clear.  First, although foreign 
participation in the office building sector was indeed quite 
significant, foreign participation in the housing market has never 
been significant.  There is no evidence that a big withdrawal of 
foreign capital from the housing market produced a collapse.  
Second, although inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the 
currency troubles in South East Asia, mortgage rates had been 
relatively stable.  Hong Kong had seen bigger mortgage rate hikes 
before but had never encountered such serious depression in the 
housing market1.  Third, it is not true that confidence collapsed 
overnight.  Indicators suggest that people had regained confidence 
not long after the Asian Financial Crisis(Table 3).  
 
It is sometimes thought that with the opening up of China Hong 
Kong’s middleman role, which had been important in supporting the 
                                                 
1  Some commentators cited high real interest rates as the culprit, but the deflation 
that caused high real interest rates did not occur until late 1998, AFTER the major 
collapse of housing prices. 
 4 
entire economy, was diminished.  But China did not start opening 
up in 1997 or 1998.  The suddenness of the reversal suggests that 
there may be other reasons.  Moreover, an examination of trade 
data, including service trade and merchandise trade, suggests that 
Hong Kong’s decline in exports in the period after 1997 was in line 
with decline in global trade, and was actually smaller relative to 
Korea, Taiwan, the UK, or the US. 
 
This paper offers an alternative explanation to Hong Kong’s 
1998 recession.  The hypothesis is that a public housing 
privatization scheme introduced by the government played an 
important role in reducing existing home transactions and home 
prices.  The large increase in housing supply since 2000 also played 
an important role in the deflationary process that started late 1998. 
This hypothesis will be substantiated both by theory and by 
statistical evidence.  
 
The theory consists of two components.  The first is that the 
housing market is a continuum with a full range of qualities and 
prices and that homeowners trade up to a better quality when they 
have accumulated sufficient equity in their current homes.  The 
ability to trade up depends crucially on the prices of existing homes. 
When prices collapse at the lower end of the market, they transmit 
readily to higher quality homes with a noticeable shrinkage in 
transaction volumes.  We hypothesize that the very attractive prices 
offered by the Housing Authority for sitting tenants to buy their own 
units under the “Tenants Purchase Scheme,”(TPS) offering up to 
88% discount on the estimated market price for buyers making a 
quick decision to buy, made it unattractive for them to buy other 
kinds of homes.  Given their earlier documented significant 
participation in the housing market this unavoidably caused home 
prices to decline.   
 
The second component points to home values as the most 
significant form of asset for the community. A decline in home 
values leads to a shrinkage in domestic consumption and domestic 
investment, and hurts employment.  Employment declines further 
hurts home values in a vicious circle. 
 5 
This paper introduces a new methodology that throws light on 
the relative influence of the public housing privatization program 
and the Asian Financial Crisis on housing transactions in Hong Kong.  
We present indirect evidence that the housing privatization program 
also adversely and significantly affected home prices through 
demonstrating that a structural break in the housing price 
relationship occurred at exactly the time the TPS policy took effect.  
Finally, a decline in home prices is found to both Granger-cause and 
be Granger-caused by a decline in employment.   
 
Section 2 presents a review of Hong Kong’s housing market and 
the public housing privatization program. Section 3 provides the data 
description and outlines the statistical tests to be conducted.  
Empirical evidence is presented in Section 4. The final section 
presents the conclusions. 
 
2. The Public Housing Privatization Program  
 
Economists normally expect that a privatization program would 
make the economy more efficient.  The experience in Hong Kong 
shows that this cannot be taken for granted.  The circumstances in 
which a privatization program is conducted, as well as how the 
privatization takes place, play an important role in determining the 
outcome. 
 
On December 8, 1997, the Housing Authority in Hong Kong 
announced that sitting tenants in designated public housing estates 
could buy their own flats at up to 88% discount off the estimated 
market price.  The move was cheered by the local press and thought 
to engender a large positive wealth effect that would boost 
consumption and give Hong Kong’s economic growth a big push. 
 
However, what transpired was a big and immediate economic 
slump.  In the first quarter of 1998, the Hong Kong economy 
declined sharply by an unprecedented 12 per cent on a 
quarter-to-quarter basis(not seasonally adjusted) and Hong Kong 
suffered a loss of 80,000 jobs—a sharp reversal from the 77,000 job 
growth in the preceding quarter.   
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The first quarter GDP decline was puzzling not only because of 
its magnitude but also because of the apparent favorable 
circumstances of the economy. The currency turmoil had shown 
signs of stabilizing, to the extent that it actually allowed one interest 
rate drop.  The HK Policy Research Institute’s housing property 
confidence index shot up from 35.5 in January to 94.2 in March 
1998.  The Heng Seng index rose 7.4 per cent in the quarter. 
  
What explained this sudden and dramatic reversal amid signs of 
revival of investor confidence?  The hypothesis that we advance in 
this paper, to be tested using various statistical tests, is that the 
public housing privatization scheme actually severed the housing 
ladder that had been in effect for years prior to the announcement of 
the TPS.  There was evidence that public housing tenants had been 
important players in the housing market.  In a survey in 1992, 
which was conducted by the Housing Authority, it was found that 24 
percent of all housing transactions were due to public housing 
tenants and that 13 per cent of all public housing tenants already 
owned at least one residential property.  Starting in April 1987, the 
Housing Authority had been implementing a policy to make the 
richer tenants with at least 10 year residence in the public rent 
housing estate to pay higher rent2.  This provided a big incentive 
for the better-off tenants to buy homes as a back-up in the event they 
were asked to pay higher rent.  The TPS effectively reversed this 
policy, for from now on rich tenants needed not leave.  They were 
offered an opportunity to capitalize all their future rental subsidies 
through a purchase decision.  
 
As expected, the demand for Home Ownership Scheme(HOS) 
housing—a government subsidized homeownership 
scheme—suddenly collapsed.  HOS housing used to attract many 
                                                 
2  In essence, the policy requires that tenants who have been accommodated for 
over ten years be subjected to a means test.  If the household income exceeds three 
times that of the maximum eligibility limit, it will have to pay double the standard 
rent.  Those who have breached stipulated income and asset thresholds are required 
to pay market rent.  See “Safeguarding Rational Allocation of Public Housing 
Resources: A Consultation Document” published by the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority in December 1995. 
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public housing tenant to buy.  Indeed they were always many times 
oversubscribed ever since the scheme started in 1978.  
Disappointed buyers would have to buy in the open market, where 
HOS units fetched very high prices, reflecting again the strong 
buying power enjoyed by the richer tenants.  Starting in June 1997, 
the Housing Authority allowed HOS owners to resell, after two years 
from their dates of original purchase, their units to public housing 
tenants and other Green Form Applicants without having to repay 
the land premium.  Records of such transactions indicate that public 
housing tenant buyers were paying very high prices for these flats, 
indicating their strong purchasing power.3  With the announcement 
of the TPS, HOS units suddenly lost their appeal, because in 
comparison they were ridiculously expensive.  Some 250,000 HOS 
owners suddenly found that their units could hardly find buyers.  
Immediately they found difficulty trading up to better homes in the 
private housing market.  Transactions in the existing home market 
plunged, in turn freezing transactions in the new homes market, 
which at the time almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up 
(see Table 4).  
 
Since public housing tenants were the primary source of buyers 
for HOS housing, the effect of TPS on HOS housing market was 
immediate.  HOS housing owners found that buyers had suddenly 
disappeared and were no longer able to trade up.  Similarly, other 
homeowners who depended on HOS buyers as their principal buyers 
also could not trade up because they also could not find buyers. 
 
Notwithstanding a highly stimulative budget in 1998 providing 
generous tax relief, generous home starter loans, and an 
unprecedented tax allowance given to homeowners for the mortgage 
interest payments, the housing market continued to fall.  By 1999 
                                                 
3  Transactions with prices were downloadable from the Housing Authority 
webpage but the information is all in Chinese.  Starting in 2003 data earlier than 
2002 were no longer downloadable.  However, we had examined the earlier records 
and found one transaction at 3.95 million Hong Kong dollars for a 644 square feet flat 
in Kowloon in September 1997.  This was not an exceptional case in 1997.  
Watanabe(1998) provided figures showing that public housing tenants generally saved 
much more than either HOS or private housing owners as well as private housing 
tenants, particularly in 1994/95. 
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the Asian Financial Crisis was over.  There was no longer any 
premium on Hong Kong dollar’s forward exchange rates, and real 
estate prices had risen markedly in Singapore4.  Hong Kong’s 
housing prices, however, continued to decline.  Even the 10.2 per 
cent growth in 2000 failed to lift prices, as home prices continued to 
slip by another 14 to 15 per cent.  By September 2001 they had 
fallen back to levels reached 10 years ago.  By 2003 housing prices 
generally had lost over 65 per cent or more of their 1997 values. 
 
3. The Statistical Tests 
 
Three statistical tests provide support to our theory.  The first 
one (the “effect on transactions” test) is to show that TPS was the 
key factor behind the big drop in existing home transactions. In a 
multivariate regression controlling the effects of various factors on 
existing home transactions, the TPS dummy was found to explain 
the decline in home transactions far better than the Financial Crisis 
dummy. The second test(the “timing test”) shows that, while exports 
had been the driving factor behind housing prices this relationship 
between exports and housing prices showed a structural change after 
1997.  Using the Johansen co-integration model with both an 
intercept and an interactive TPS/exports dummy, we found a 
structural break at the time of the announcement of the TPS.  This 
suggests that housing probably serve as a transmission mechanism 
between the external (the exports) sector and the domestic sector, but 
this mechanism appears to have been severed by the TPS policy.  
Finally, the third test(the “effect on employment” test) shows that 
housing prices and employment are co-integrated so a collapse in 
housing prices would have a serious effect on employment.  Our 
statistical results indicate that the reverse causality also holds, so that 
a vicious circle forms, rendering it difficult to launch a convincing 
recovery.  
 
The Data 
 
In the first test, the focus of analysis is second-hand transaction 
volume for private sector residential properties.  This variable is of 
                                                 
4  Singapore housing prices fell again subsequent to the bursting of the IT bubble. 
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great interest because normally when a homeowner sells his property 
he would buy another.  In contrast, to the extent that new housing 
has already been produced and a new home purchase represents only 
a transfer from the developer’s inventory to the homebuyer, buying 
an existing home generates more additional economic activities than 
when a household buys a new unit from the developer5.   
 
The housing price of private domestic flats is treated as a 
variable to explain second-hand transactions.  The data on this 
variable is the monthly housing price index of private domestic units, 
which is supplied by the Rating and Valuation Department of the 
Government.  The period covered in this study is from July 1995 to 
March 2004.  Second-hand transaction data is not available before 
July 1995.  The period covered both the Asian Financial Crisis and 
the Tenants Purchase Scheme(TPS)—the public housing 
privatization program of the Housing Authority.   
 
Besides, dummy variables are used to capture the effects of key 
changes in the environment, namely the Financial Crisis 
Dummy(FCD) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) - as well as 
a dummy to control the first quarter effect of home purchase pattern 
(FQR) which may affect transaction volume6.  During times of 
acute loss of confidence such as resulting from the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the local currency is subjected to tremendous pressures to 
depreciate.  While the spot exchange rate holds its place a 
considerable discount in the value of the local currency appears in 
the forward market.  We therefore find it convenient to use the 
forward market premium of the US dollar over the spot market 
exchange rate as an instrument to measure the degree of the financial 
crisis.  An important advantage of using this dummy over an 
“on-off” dummy is that there is no need to make arbitrary decision as 
to when the financial crisis is “switched on” and when it is 
“switched off.”  In order to facilitate interpretation, we normalize 
this variable to set the maximum value of this dummy within the 
                                                 
5  A “tree” of second hand transactions usually ends up in a first hand high end 
property.  On the other hand, if a first time buyer buys a new home the economic 
stimulation is more limited. 
6  This effect has to do with the fact that Chinese New Year falls in the first quarter. 
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observation period to unity 7 .  FCD is therefore a non-binary, 
continuous dummy free from arbitrary assumption about when the 
financial crisis set in and when it phased out.  Since the TPS was 
announced by the Hong Kong Housing Authority on December 8 
1997 we assign the value of ‘0’ to months prior to December 1997 
and assigned the value of unity for months from December 1997 
onwards.   
 
Employment and total exports statistics are based on official 
seasonally adjusted data.  The real prime rate is simply defined as 
nominal prime rate minus the rate of inflation for the comprehensive 
consumer price index.  For the list and definition of variables that 
are analyzed, please refer to Table 9.   
 
Empirical findings 
 
Test One: The Relative Effects of TPS and Financial Crisis on 
Transactions 
 
In this test we attempt to assess the relative impacts of the 
introduction of the TPS and the Asian Financial Crisis on 
second-hand transaction volume.  The length of the time series 
allows us to use the Johansen cointegration method to test the long 
term relationships of the key variables.  The dependent variable for 
the first test is the logarithm(log) of the second-hand home 
transaction volume (LTRAN).  The explanatory variables include 
the log of the housing price index (LPPI), the log of the nominal 
prime rate (LPR), the financial crisis dummy FCD, which is proxied 
by the difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-year 
forward rate, normalized as discussed above), and binary dummy 
variables TPS(unity from 1997:12, 0 prior to this8), and FQR(1 for 
first 3 months every year).  It is expected that any increase in 
                                                 
7  The value of this dummy is therefore 1 at the point of most intensive pressure for 
the currency to devalue and 0 when there were no such pressures.  More recently 
there were some episodes when the sign became negative so there was an expectation 
for the currency to appreciate. 
8  In November 2002 the Government announced a plan to terminate the TPS, but 
termination will not be effective until after 2004, when the last batch of TPS units 
have been sold. 
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housing prices will allow homeowners to trade theirs for better ones 
and thus tends to drive up transactions.  On the other hand an 
increase in interest rates will dampen transactions because this will 
increase the costs of owning a new home or a better home. 
 
We begin the analysis by examining the stationarity properties of 
the variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The optimal lag in the test is chosen by 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 5.1 shows that the test 
statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences, 
respectively. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected 
when the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in 
first differences, showing that all the series are integrated of order 
one.  
 
Since the variables are integrated of the same order (I(1)), we 
can use the Johansen procedure(1988).  Under this procedure, we 
first identify the long-run relationship among LTRAN, LPPI, and 
LPR.  Following the common practice, the dummy variables FCD, 
TPS and FQR are all treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the VAR 
and the error-correction model.  
 
The co-integration test results are presented in the Table 5.2. The 
number of co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the 
λmax and trace statistics. The lag specification for the Johansen test 
is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). The results 
show that TRAN, LPPI and LPR are cointegrated with only one 
conitegrating vector.. 
 
Table 5.3 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients that 
will be interpreted as long run equilibrium coefficients. Coefficients 
on both LPPI and LPR are significant with the expected signs. In 
general, price appreciation provides an incentive and a greater ability 
for homeowners to trade up, thus pushing up second hand 
transaction.  The interest rate, on the other hand, discourages home 
purchases and tends to dampen transactions. In addition, given that 
the variables are cointegrated, we then estimate the error correction 
model as shown in Table 5.4. The ECM coefficient enters 
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significantly with negative sign. The significant negative ECM 
coefficient confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists 
between them.  It is noteworthy that the dampening effect of the 
Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS dummy) is greater than that of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC dummy) and is statistically much more 
significant. (See Table 5.4 coefficients of the TPS and AFC dummy). 
Because both the TPS dummy and the financial crisis dummy have 
values between 0 and 1 their coefficients can be directly compared 
with each other. We can see that the effect of the TPS is much bigger 
and more significant than that of the financial crisis. 
 
Test Two:  Structural Break and Timing  
 
In this test we identify the timing and the magnitude of a 
structural break in the housing price equation.  The housing price 
equation is based on the assumption that the housing market was 
essentially in equilibrium over the test period.  When the housing 
market was in equilibrium, housing prices reflect the bids from 
buyers which increase when their incomes rise.  We write a 
housing price equation with two explanatory variables: exports of 
goods and services which represents the key exogenous determinant 
of incomes for a small open economy, and interest rates.  We 
dropped the inflation rate variable in the equation because this 
variable did not carry a statistically significant coefficient.  
Separate testing also shows that property price affects inflation 
rather than inflation affects property price. Dropping the inflation 
variable and testing alternatively timed dummy variables will allow 
us to identify the timing and the magnitude of any structural change. 
 
Two kinds of dummy variables—one for the intercept and one 
“interactive dummy”—are used to capture any shift and change in 
the magnitudes of key coefficients in the relationship.  We switch 
the dummy variables from 0 to unity in different quarters and assess 
the t statistics on the coefficients.   We found that a structural 
break occurred in the first quarter of 1998.  Interestingly, this 
coincides with our priors, since the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme—which we have reason will have significant structural 
changes on the housing market, was announced on December 8. 
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We use a fairly standard time series technique in this statistical 
analysis, the Johansen co-integration procedure.  We first check the 
stationarity properties of the variables. The ADF test results show 
that the null hypothesis of containing a unit root can only be rejected 
when the series are first differenced.  Thus the series are all 
integrated of order one I(1)9. Since the variables are integrated of the 
same order I(1), we can apply the Johansen procedure (1988). The 
lag length of the VAR is determined by Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC).   As is standard, both the slope and the intercept 
dummy variables are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the 
co-integrating equation and the error correction model.  
 
The cointegration test results for the model incorporating the 
most significant dummy variables—switching to unity in the first 
quarter of 1998—are presented in Table 6.1 through Table 6.4.  
Table 6.1 presents evidence that LnPPI is cointegrated with the 
LnEX and LnPRI.  Table 6.2 shows that the normalized 
cointegrating coefficients on LnEx and LnPR carry the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. The error correction model, 
reported in Table 6.3, showing a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the ECM term, confirms the earlier findings that 
cointegration exists between the variables.   
 
Table 6.4 shows that the key coefficients, t statistics, and 
adjusted R-squared for models with dummies switched on in 
different quarters.  Readers can testify that there is an obvious jump 
in the t statistic and the goodness of fit when the switch occurred in 
98Q1 rather than 97Q4. Since TPS was announced on December 8 
this result is just right.  The negative coefficient on the interactive 
term for exports shows that exports growth no longer provided the 
housing market the kind of support it used to; the positive coefficient 
on the interactive term for the interest rate shows that a decline in 
interest rates would not provide much stimulation either.  The 
positive intercept dummy term probably catches the effects of 
various stimulative policies introduced by the government to 
counteract the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
                                                 
9  Test results are not reported on space considerations.  
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Based on the estimated error correction model reported in Table 
6.3, we have plotted the fitted values against the actual ones in the 
Figure 1. The model tracks the actual data very well indeed.   
 
Conclusion from the test: We found a structural break that occurred 
in the first quarter of 1998, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that TPS caused the structural break.  The stimulative effects of 
exports on Hong Kong’s housing prices were reduced significantly 
from the first quarter of 1998. 
 
Test Three: Relationship between Housing Market and Employment 
 
We investigated the long run relationship and causality between 
employment (LnEMP) and residential property price (LnPPI) using 
the Johansen procedure. The analysis began by examining the 
stationarity properties of the variables using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller(ADF) Test. The test results show that the null 
hypothesis of containing a unit root can only be rejected when the 
series are in first differences indicating the both series: LnEMP and 
LnPPI are integrated of order one I(1)10. 
 
Since the variables are integrated of the same order I(1), the next 
step is to carry out co-integration analyses of the variables. We first 
identify the long-run causal relationships by using the Johansen 
procedure (1988). The lag length of the VAR for each case is 
determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 7.1. The 
results show that the LnPPI is cointegrated with the LnEMP. Table 
7.2 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients which indicate 
that the LnPPI has a positive and significant impact on the LnEMP.  
It also confirms that the vector error correction model (VECM) is 
appropriate for examining their long run causal relationships. The 
coefficients of the error correction terms (ECM) and their t-statistics 
are shown in Table 7.3. The ECM coefficients turn out to be 
significant with negative sign when either LnPPI or LnEMP is 
                                                 
10  The test results are not reported here for space considerations.  
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treated as the dependent variable. The significant negative ECM 
coefficient, which indicates the channel of causality in the long run, 
also confirms the earlier findings that cointegration exists between 
them. Based on these results, we can conclude that there exists a 
bi-directional causality between employment and property price.  
 
Conclusion from the test: There is bi-directional causality between 
housing price and employment.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our empirical findings have shown that residential property 
price, interest rates, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the 
implementation of the Tenants Purchase Scheme are important 
determinants of the second-hand home transaction volume. Price 
appreciation allows existing homeowners to trade up for better 
homes and boosts confidence.  Interest rate increases are found to 
have clearly dampening effects on housing market transactions.  Of 
particular interest is the finding that the Tenants Purchase Scheme is 
found to have a significant and a greater negative effect on the 
housing transactions than the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
During the mid-1990s, Hong Kong house prices appreciated 
rapidly as funds poured in from among the richer public housing 
tenants. After the Asian Financial Crisis, housing transactions have 
eased and house prices have slipped.  At the eve of the 
announcement of the TPS on 8 December 1997 housing market 
transactions had appeared to have stabilized (Table 4), while 
indicators of confidence in November appeared to be momentarily 
restored (Table 3).  Yet in December home transactions 
unexpectedly plunged to new lows, and home prices began their 
dramatic downturn (Table 8). 
 
Notwithstanding Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth in 2000 
at 10.2 per cent home prices continued to fall, losing over 14 per 
cent in the year.  Our theory is that this has to do with the 
immobilization of the existing homeowners as a result of TPS.  
Because land developers from now on could only depend on 
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first-time buyers to buy their homes, they needed to keep reducing 
their asking prices in order to reach potential buyers with a lower 
purchasing power.  This inevitably worsened the negative equity 
problem, both by dragging more homeowners into the trap and 
deepening the trap.   
 
This has resulted in a serious credit crunch particularly for small 
and medium enterprises who had now lost a collateral against which 
they could get loans.  This caused business activities to slow down 
and certainly worsened the decline of commercial properties.  Our 
tests indicate that as housing prices decline employment falls.  A 
fall in employment in turn affects housing prices adversely creating 
a vicious circle. 
 
Although our hypothesis that TPS played an important role in 
Hong Kong’s economic slump in 1998 stands, it does not follow that 
privatization of public housing must necessarily cause such 
problems.  All the negative effects of the TPS may well have been 
avoided if the government had adopted the Ho(1995) model of 
privatization of public housing.  Under that model, only those who 
are poor enough to qualify for housing assistance could buy, while 
resale of any sold units are restricted to “eligible” households.  
Ho’s stipulation would have disqualified the richer tenants from 
buying their units and would have retained the attractiveness of HOS 
housing thus maintaining the liquidity that had been flowing into the 
housing market.  Given the huge linkage effect on the economy of 
the housing market(Case,2000), governments pondering 
privatization schemes need to learn from the experience in Hong 
Kong.  
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Table 1: Hong Kong’s Economic Growth 1961-2002(GDP % change) 
 
Year % 
change 
Year % 
change
Year % 
change
Year % 
change
Year % 
change
1961 n.a. 1971 7.1 1981 9.2 1991 5.1 2001 0.5
1962 14.2 1972 10.3 1982 2.7 1992 6.3 2002# 2.3
1963 15.7 1973 12.4 1983 5.7 1993 6.1 2003# 3.3
1964 8.6 1974 2.3 1984 10.0 1994 5.3  
1965 14.5 1975 0.3 1985 0.4 1995 3.9  
1966 1.7 1976 16.2 1986 10.8 1996 5.3  
1967 1.7 1977 11.7 1987 13.0 1997 5.1  
1968 3.3 1978 8.5 1988 8.0 1998 -5.0  
1969 11.3 1979 11.5 1989 2.6 1999 3.4  
1970 9.2 1980 10.1 1990 3.4 2000 10.2  
Source: Gross Domestic Product 1961-1999, Government of HKSAR, plus updates 
from: http://www.info.gov.hk/hkecon/gdp/index.htm 
# Preliminary 
 
 
 
Table 2: Employment Situation 1997:4 to 1999:4 
 
Period Labour Force Employment Jobs Gained
or  Lost 
(‘000) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1997:4 3.297 3.2214 77.7 2.2 
1998:1 3.247 3.1414 -80.0 3.3 
1998:2 3.258 3.1177 -23.7 4.3 
1998:3 3.290 3.1143 -3.4 5.2 
1998:4 3.310 3.1154 1.1 5.9 
1999:1 3.297 3.0928 -22.6 6.3 
1999:2 3.326 3.1235 30.7 6.1 
1999:3 3.316 3.1016 -21.9 6.3 
1999:4 3.340 3.1313 29.7 6.3 
Source: Census and Statistics Department 
Note: This Table shows that even after the Asian Financial Crisis, in the last 
quarter of 1997, employment grew by 77,700.  In the following quarter 80,000 jobs 
were lost.  The loss of housing market turnover as well as the decline in housing 
prices subsequent to TPS translated into a loss of jobs. 
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Table 3: Indicators of Changes of Confidence 1997:4-2000:4 
 
Quarter or 
Month 
Hang Seng Index 
At End of Period 
The US$ Premium on 
the HK Dollar in the 
1-Year Forward Market 
2000:4 15095 -154 
2000:3 15649 -142 
2000:2 16156 -9 
2000:1 17406 48 
99:4 16962 396 
99:3 12733 909 
99:2 13532 959 
99:1 10942 1547 
98:4 10049 1512 
98:3 7883 4235 
98:2 8543 4201 
98:I 11519 2396 
97:Dec 10723 4036 
Nov. 10527 4055 
Oct. 10624 2336 
Source:  Hong Kong Monetary Authority and http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^HSI 
Note:  Negative values suggest an expectation that the Hong Kong dollar would 
appreciate in a year.
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Table 4: Monthly Transactions of Private Homes 
 
 Year/Month  First Hand Homes Second Hand Homes   
 9707  2,147 17,227 
 9708  2,044 8,595 
 9709  1,396 7,800 
 9710  2,174 8,315 
 9711  1,343 8,653 
 9712  364 3,804 
 9701-9712  20,380 133,555 
 9801  2,334 3,598 
 9802  868 2,883 
 9803  2,636 5,501 
 9804  649 4,683 
 9805  2,429 4,364 
 9806  3,871 3,413 
 9807  1,880 3,337 
 9801-9812  31,599 48,110 
 9901  1,999 5,012 
 9907  1,394 4,317 
 9901-9912  21,557 46,565 
 0001  695 4,000 
 0007  2,400 2,929 
 0001-0012  17,830 39,089 
 0101  857 2,364 
 0109  1,109 3,221 
Source:  Centaline Property Agency Ltd. 
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Table 5.1  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1995 to 2004 ) 
 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
TRAN 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.9880 
-13.1256 
-2.4257** 
-13.0912*** 
I(1) 
 
LPPI Level 
1st diff 
-0.7822 
-2.8597 
-5.6593** 
-5.6401** 
I(1) 
 
LPR Level 
1st diff 
-0.5627 
-1.8002 
-4.6590** 
-4.6917** 
I(1) 
Note: 
1.  95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; 
and constant plus  
 trend = 2.8900 and -3.4552 respectively. 
2. The number of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC  
3. ** indicates 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2  Testing Cointegration using the Johansen Procedure 
 
Cointegrating  
Relation 
Null  
Hypothesis
Alternative
Hypothesis
Test 
Statistics 
Critical 
Values 
(5%) 
Critical  
Values 
(10%) 
TRAN  
= f (LPPI, LPR) 
With exogenous 
dummy variables  
FCD, TPS and FQR 
Trace tests:
r = 0 
r?1 
 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
Trace Value
79.0994***
5.4318 
 
 
31.54 
17.86 
 
 
28.78 
15.75 
 
 λ max tests:  λ max Value   
 
 
r = 0 
r = 1 
r = 1 
r = 2 
73.6676***
5.0776 
21.12 
14.88 
19.02 
12.98 
Notes: 
1.  *** denotes significance at 1% level  
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors 
3. As individual series clearly exhibits trending pattern, we consider regressions 
with unrestricted constant and restricted trend 
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Table 5.3 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure 
 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
LPPI 
 
LPR 
1.0114 
 
-0.2155 
7.0094*** 
 
2.0917** 
Note: ** and *** denotes significance at 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
 
 
Table 5.4. Error Correction Model (Dependent variable:?TRAN) 
 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
?TRAN(-1) -0.0263 (-0.2474) 
?TRAN(-2) -0.02818 (-0.3036) 
?LPPI(-1) 3.3477 (4.1674)*** 
?LPPI(-2) 2.0245 (2.3967)** 
?LPR(-1) -1.7724 (-1.7189)* 
?LPR(-2) 0.7121 (0.6895) 
Constant 0.2291 (4.6053)*** 
FCD -0.1603 (-1.6199)* 
TPS -0.2233 (-3.7519)*** 
FQR -0.0993 (-2.2092)** 
ECMt-1 -0.8351 (-6.6350)*** 
Adj R-squared:  0.4347  
Note:  *, ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
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Table 6.1 Testing Cointegration between LnPPI, LnEx and LnPR using the 
Johansen Procedure with dummy variables, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Null  
Hypothesis 
Alternative  
Hypothesis 
Test  
Statistics 
LnPPI = f (LnEx, LnPR) Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r?1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
42.33** 
17.30 
 
λ max Value 
25.02** 
16.74* 
Notes:  
1. ** denotes significance at 5% level 
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
3. VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure 
 
Cointegrating equation: 
LnPPI = f (LnEX, LnPR) 
Coefficient t-statistic 
LnPR -0.5224 -1.9180* 
LnEX 0.6986 2.6890** 
Notes: 
1. ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
3. LnEx*D98q1, LnPr*D98q1 and D98q1 are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in 
the cointegrating equation 
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Table 6.3 Error Correction Representation of Johansen Model  
(Dependent variable:?LnPPIt) 
 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -0.4652 (-3.6727)*** 
Trend 0.0028 (3.3701)*** 
∆LnPPIt-1 0.4504 (4.2074)*** 
∆LnEXt-1 -0.3313 (-1.7721)* 
∆LnPRt-1 0.0278 (0.4618) 
ECMt-1 -0.1669 (-3.9358)*** 
LnEX * D98Q1 -0.3622 (-1.9930)** 
LnPR * D98Q1 0.1636 (2.3551)** 
D98Q1 
Adj R-squared:  0.5300 
4.2173 (1.8136)* 
Note: 
1. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
2. * , ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively 
3. ?denotes first difference. 
 
 
Table 6.4  A Timing Test by Switching Dummy Variables to Unity in Different 
Quarters 
 
Quarter with 
Value of Dummy 
Switched to Unity
LnEX * DQ LnPR * DQ Intercept 
Dummy DQ 
Adjusted R2 in 
ECM model 
1997 Q2 -0.0036 
(-0.0213) 
-0.0187  
(-0.3253) 
0.0254  
(0.0114) 
0.4399 
1997 Q3 0.0040 
(0.0235) 
-0.0206 
(-0.3616) 
-0.0716 
(-0.0322) 
0.4408 
1997 Q4 -0.0116 
(-0.0679) 
-0.0054 
(-0.0904) 
0.1015 
(0.0452) 
0.4350 
1998 Q1 -0.3622  
(-1.9930)** 
0.1636  
(2.3551)** 
4.2173  
(1.8136)* 
0.5300 
1998 Q2 -0.2483 
(-1.3515) 
0.1335 
(1.9677)** 
2.8794 
(1.2134) 
0.4520 
1998 Q3 -0.2829 
(-1.5453) 
0.1435 
(2.1206)** 
3.2985 
(1.3943) 
0.4634 
Note:  Figures are estimated coefficients and the adjusted R2 for the error 
correction models. t-statistics are in brackets. DQ is a dummy variable that switches 
to unity in the quarter on the left column. 
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Table 7.1: Testing Cointegration between LnEMP and LnPPI using the Johansen 
Procedure, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Null  
Hypothesis 
Alternative  
Hypothesis 
Test  
Statistics 
LnEMP = f (LnPPI) Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r?1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
20.14** 
3.05 
 
λ max Value 
17.09*** 
3.05 
Notes:   
1. ** denotes significance at 5% level. 
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
3. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
 
 
 
Table 7.2  Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients (Bivariate Estimates) Using 
the Johansen Procedure 
 
Cointegrating equation: 
LnEMP = f (LnPPI) 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  0.8081 6.1108*** 
LnPPI 0.0633 2.4376** 
Notes: 
1. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
3. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 Causality Tests Using the VECM Approach 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Coefficient  
for ECM(-1) 
t-statistics  
for ECM(-1) 
DLEMP 
DLPPI 
LnPPI does not cause LnEMP 
LnEMP does not cause LnPPI 
-0.0684 
-0.1777 
-3.3752** 
-2.4483** 
Notes: 
1. ** denotes significance at 5%. 
2. D denotes first difference 
3. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
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Table 8: Housing Price Index(Overall) 
 
Year & Month Price Index Percentage Change 
9701 142.7 6.1 
9702 154.3 8.1 
9703 162.2 5.1 
9704 157.0 -3.2 
9705 172.3 9.7 
9706 172.0 -0.2 
9707 167.2 -2.8 
9708 171.1 2.3 
9709 170.3 -0.5 
9710 172.9 1.5 
9711 160.5 -7.2 
9712 155.0 -3.4 
9806 112.5 -27.4 
9812 104.6 -7.0 
9906 102.3 -2.2 
9912 95.7 -6.5 
0006 86.0 -10.1 
0012 81.8 -4.9 
0106 80.9 -1.1 
0112 73.8 -8.8 
Source:  Rating and Valuation Department 
Note: From 1998 the percentage price changes are reported for every six months.  
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Table 9. List of variables and their definitions 
 
Short Form Explanatory Variables Definition of Variables 
 
TRAN 
 
 
 
 
 
PPI 
 
FCD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TPS 
 
 
 
 
FQR 
 
 
PR 
 
 
 
EX 
 
 
D98Q1 
 
 
 
DQ 
 
 
EMP 
 
 
 
Second hand home 
transaction volume 
(dependent variable) 
 
 
 
Property Price Index 
 
Financial Crisis Dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 
 
 
 
 
First Quarter Effect 
 
 
Prime Rate 
 
 
 
Total Exports of Goods and 
Services 
 
Dummy Variable 
 
 
 
Timing Test Dummy 
 
 
Employment 
 
 
Monthly volume figures are no. 
of registration of transactions in 
private residential properties in 
the second hand market and 
provided by Centaline Ltd. 
 
Property price index 
 
This is a non-binary dummy 
variable derived from the 
12-month forward rate premium 
of the US dollar on the HK 
dollar.  It is normalized to have 
a maximum value of unity . 
 
1 starting from the 
announcement of the scheme in 
December 1997, 0 before that 
month (Monthly Data) 
 
1 for months in the first quarter 
of the year, 0 otherwise 
 
moving average of the prime 
rate for 3 quarters ending in the 
current quarter 
 
In million HKD (current price), 
seasonally adjusted 
 
1 starting from the 1998 1st 
quarter, 0 before that quarter 
(Quarterly Data) 
 
1 starting from the quarter 
tested, 0 prior to that quarter 
 
in thousands, seasonally 
adjusted 
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Figure 1. Predicted Values for the Housing Price Index Using JH Model 
Incorporating Dummy Variables Switched to Unity from 1998:quarter 1 
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